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and Isaac Ehrlich on the Deterrent Effect
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David C. Baldust and James W. L. Cole#
During the last 20 years, a substantial number of empirical studies
-most prominent among them the work of criminologist Thorsten
Sellin-have concluded that the death penalty has no measurable de-
terrent effect beyond that of life imprisonment.' A recent study by
Isaac Ehrlich, an economist, challenges this traditional view.2 Ehrlich
criticizes Sellin's statistical methods and, on the basis of a more com-
plex statistical procedure, estimates that "an additional execution per
year over the period in question [1933-1969] may have resulted, on
average, in 7 or 8 fewer murders."3 In Fowler v. North Carolina,4 the
constitutional challenge to the death penalty now pending in the Su-
preme Court, the Solicitor General presented Ehrlich's findings to the
Court and in his amicus brief cited them as "important empirical sup-
port for the a priori logical belief that use of the death penalty de-
creases the number of murders."5 The Solicitor General asserted that
earlier studies, and specifically those of Sellin, suffered from "investi-
gatory flaws" and that only Ehrlich's work provided a reliable basis
for judging whether the death penalty has a deterrent effect.0 Now
that Fowler has been set for reargument, 7 an assessment of the Solicitor
General's claims has particular importance.
A statistical study cannot prove that executions deter murders, nor
* We are grateful for the assistance of David Engels in the preparation of this article.
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ALTY]; Sellin, Capital Punishment, 25 FED. PROBATION 3 (1961); Selin, Homicides in Re-
tentionist and Abolitionist States, in CAPITAL PUNISHMENT 135 (T. Sellin ed. 1967) [here-
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EXECUTIONS IN AMERICA 19-20 (1974). See generally Allen, Capital Punishment, 2 INT'L
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3. Ehrlich 1975, supra note 2, at 414.
4. State v. Fowler, 285 N.C. 90, 203 S.E.2d 803, cert. granted sub nom. Fowler v. North
Carolina, 419 U.S. 963 (1974), argued, 43 U.S.L.W. 3582 (U.S. Apr. 21, 1975), restored
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Brief]. The Solicitor Geaeral submitted the Ehrlich Working Paper, supra note 2, to the
Court on March 7, 1975.
6. Id. at 36-38.
7. 422 U.S. 1039 (1975).
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can it prove that they do not. Given a hypothesis about a causal re-
lationship, however, a statistical analysis can determine whether that
hypothesis is consistent with past experience. Both Sellin and Ehrlich
tested the hypothesis that capital punishment deters murders. Both
used a variable to represent the threat of capital punishment, and
both compared that variable with the behavior of homicide rates in
the United States.8 However, they used different statistical methods
to make their comparisons and arrived at different conclusions.
Sellin used a "matching" technique.9 He selected clusters of neigh-
boring states "closely similar" in "social organization, composition of
population, [and] economic and social conditions"; in each grouping
at least one state had abolished the death penalty and at least one
retained it.10 He then compared the homicide rates for theyears 1920-
1955 and 1920-1962 in abolitionist and retentionist states within each
group, and found that the rates in abolitionist states were not signifi-
cantly or systematically different than the rates in retentionist states."
8. Since the public records kept by the FBI do not include statistics on the number
of murders committed each year, the researchers in this area must use the number of
"murders and nonnegligent manslaughters" as a surrogate measure of the number of mur-
ders. This statistic is generally considered adequate on the assumption that the proportion
of murders to nonnegligent manslaughters remains constant from one year to the next.
Sellin, Capital Punishment, supra note I, at 5-6; see Ehrlich 1975, supra note 2, at 406-07
(accounting for possible increasing trend in fraction of capital murders among all murders
by including chronological time as a factor influencing the homicide rate). Throughout
this paper we refer to the "homicide rate" in discussing the data analyzed by Sellin and
Ehrlich, with the understanding that the underlying theoretical relationship is between
executions and the murder rate.
9. Sellin also performed longitudinal studies of crime rates before and after a change
in punishment policy in a given jurisdiction. See note 46 infra.
10. THE DEATH PENALTY, supra note I, at 23.
11. Tables I and II illustrate the results reported in THE DEATH PENALTY, supra
note 1, at 21-34, and Homicides, supra note 1, at 136-37.
TABLE I
Comparative Crude Homicide Death Rates in States with and States without the
Death Penalty-Average Annual Rate 1920-1955 (Death Penalty States Are Marked D)
Midwest
Matched Group I Matched Group 2 Matched Group 3
D D D D D
North South
Michigan Indiana Ohio Minnesota Wisconsin Iowa* Dahota' Dakota* Nebraska
4.8 4.8 6.1 2.2 1.8 1.7 1.4 1.6 2.7
New England
Mlatched Group I Mfatched Group 2
D D D D
New Rhode
Mlaine Hampshire Vermont Island Mlassachusett Connecticut
1.6 1.3 1.2 1.7 1.7 2.3
* 1923-1955 t 1924-1955 + 1930-1955
Adapted from F. ZINIuNN & G. HAwKiNs, supra note 1, at 265, using data from THE
DEATH PENALTY, supra note 1, at 25, 28.
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From this evidence he drew the "inevitable conclusion . . . that ex-
ecutions have no discernible effect on homicide death rates .... -12
Ehrlich focused instead on the relationship in the nation as a whole
between the homicide rate and "execution risk"-the fraction of per-
sons convicted of murder who were subsequently executed. He com-
pared the differences in homicide rate and execution risk for the years
1933-1969, and found a positive simple correlation between changes
in the homicide rate and changes in execution risk-increases in ex-
ecution risk were associated with increases in the homicide rate. 13
However, when he controlled for the influence of other variables on
the homicide rate by using a multiple regression analysis, the rela-
tionship became negative. More precisely, he estimated that the elas-
TABLE II
Homicide Death Rates (per 100,000 Population) in Contiguous
Abolitionist and Retentionist States, 1920-1963.




1920 1925 1930 1935 1940 1945 1950 1955 1960 1963
Maine is an abolitionist state.
5.0 'RI. Mas.3o .lol.........  .... Wi. -. . .
24.0
3.0-
1920 1925 1930 1935 1940 1945 1950 1955 1960 1963
Rhode Island is an abolitionist state.
in 2 CA9ITA 19N30E 1935 T.Sc 40d. Harpe 15 Ro),Coyrgh5 1967 by6
4inst Mind Wiscnsi -r abliiois states.
Thorsten Sellin.
12. THE DEATH PENALTY, supra note 1, at 34; see Homicides, supra note 1, at 138
("The conclusion is inevitable that the presence of the death penalty-in law or practice
-does not influence homicide death rates.")
13. hrlich 1975, supra note 1, at 409. Simple correlation analysis does not take into
account the influence of other factors on the homicide rate, and hence is statistically
less sophisticated than the multiple regression analysis on which Ehrlich relies for his
conclusions.
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ticity of the homicide rate with respect to the execution rate was
approximately -. 0614-that is, a .06 percent decrease in the homicide
rate was associated with a one percent increase in execution risk. This
finding was the basis for his estimate that "on the average the tradeoff
between the execution of an offender and the lives of potential vic-
tims it might have saved was of the order of magnitude of 1 for 8
for the period 1933-67 in the United States," and for his "tentative
and rough calculation [that] the decline in [execution risk] alone
might have accounted for about 25 percent of the increase in the
murder rate between 1960 and 1967." 15
In this paper, we compare the work of Sellin and Ehrlich and at-
tempt to assess the reliability of their statistical evidence as a basis
for making inferences about the deterrent effect of capital punishment.
We consider three aspects of their research design: (1) the choice of
a measure to represent capital punishment; (2) the choice of the nation
or state as the unit of observation; and (3) the ability to control for
factors other than the death penalty which may affect the homicide
rate. We then discuss the replication or corroboration of their results
by studies using the same or similar methods. While we do not argue
that Sellin and others who have followed his approach have proven
conclusively that the death penalty has no greater deterrent effect than
life imprisonment, we believe that Sellin's work, despite its methodo-
logical shortcomings, offers a more reliable basis than Ehrlich's recent
work for inferring whether the threat of capital punishment deters
murders. Future studies by Ehrlich or others may weaken the credibili-
ty of work that went before him, but on the record to date Sellin
makes the stronger case.
It is quite true that Ehrlich's approach is statistically more sophis-
ticated than Sellin's. But statistical sophistication is no cure for flaws
in model construction and research design. There are many questions
which, because of inadequacies of data or theory, are best studied by
simpler methods. The deterrent effect of capital punishment is at this
point just such a question.
I. Measuring the Threat of Capital Punishment:
Actual Use or Legal Status
The Solicitor General criticized Sellin's work on the ground that
it "relied not upon the actual use of the death penalty, but upon its
statutory authorization, as the independent variable against which the
14. Id. at 410 (Tables 3 9- 4).
15. Id. at 398, 414 n.15.
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murder rate was compared."' 6 This criticism echoed Ehrlich's argu-
ment that "the actual enforcement of the death penalty [as measured
by execution risk] may be a far more important factor affecting of-
fenders' behavior than the legal status of the penalty."' 7
There is, of course, a necessary link between the legal status and
actual use of capital punishment; the penalty cannot be used if it is
not authorized. Moreover, the factor which is directly controlled by
courts and legislatures is the legal status of the penalty. The precise
question now facing the Supreme Court is whether capital punishment
must be abolished, not whether its use should be increased or decreased
assuming it is retained. For some purposes, it may be of interest to
investigate the effects of increasing the number of executions in re-
tentionist jurisdictions. But in the debate over abolition, the essential
question is the effect of changing from a retentionist to an abolitionist
jurisdiction.' 8 Sellin's approach is directly addressed to this policy
choice, and Ehrlich's approach is not.
Sellin compared the homicide rates within six clusters of abolitionist
and retentionist states.19 The execution levels in the retentionist states
ranged from New Hampshire (one execution in the years 1920-1955)
to Ohio (an average of seven executions a year).2 0 Assuming that the
penalty, if retained, would be applied as infrequently as in the past
15 years,21 Sellin's comparisons of abolitionist states with retentionist
states which rarely executed people become highly relevant. His other
comparisons bear directly on the choice between abolition and reten-
tion at the higher execution levels of the earlier years.
22
Ehrlich's comparison of the homicide rates with the ratio of execu-
tions to convictions-execution risk-is less relevant to the question
of abolition. His analysis focuses on the marginal effects of small
changes in execution risk-the number of murders deterred by one
16. Amicus Brief, supra note 5, at 36 (emphasis in original).
17. Ehrlich 1975, supra note 2, at 415.
18. For a discussion of the relative reliability of various research designs as a basis
for making causal inference about the impact of a particular law, see D. CAIPBELL &
J. STANLEY, EXPERIMENTAL AND QUASI-EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN FOR RESEARCH (1966); SOCIAL
EXPERIMENTATION: A METHOD FOR PLANNING AND EVALUATING SOCIAL INTERVENTION 97-
116 (H. Rieken & R. Boruch eds. 1974); F. ZINRING & G. HAwKINS, supra note 1, at 249-
326; Campbell, Legal Reforms as Experiments, 23 J. LEGAL EDUC. 219-30 (1970).
19. Sellin did not, however, rely simply on the legal status of the penalty. He in-
cluded in the category of abolitionist states three which had abolished the penalty ex-
cept for treason and certain types of murders and had never applied the penalty after
it was abolished for ordinary murders. THE DEATH PENALTY, supra note 1, at 1-2.
20. Id. at 25, 28, 32.
21. There was an average of 36 executions in the years 1961-1964, seven in 1965, one
in 1966, two in 1967, and none since 1967. W. BOWERs, supra note 1, at 23.
22. The average numbers of executions for the five year periods between 1930 and
1960 were 155, 178, 129, 128, 83, and 61. Id. at 22-23.
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more execution-rather than on the difference between jurisdictions
which do and do not use capital punishment. In Ehrlich's regression
equation, the estimated homicide rate increases proportionally as ex-
ecution risk declines. To predict the effect of abolition on the homicide
rate, execution risk is simply set equal to zero in the equation. Rep-
resenting abolition by zero execution risk fails to distinguish de facto
abolition-where the death penalty is authorized but not currently ap-
plied-from de jure abolition. Yet even the legal possibility, however
remote, of execution might have some deterrent effect. Because of its
reliance on execution risk rather than the statutory authorization of
the penalty, Ehrlich's study could not detect such an effect.
Moreover, for the particular mathematical form in which Ehrlich
constructs his equation, zero execution risk implies either an infinitely
large or a zero homicide rate (depending on whether the elasticity
for execution risk is negative or positive).23 These absurd implications
show the equation was not designed to predict the effect of abolition.
Even if one used a mathematical form which could generate a mean-
ingful prediction of the homicide rate after abolition, such a predic-
tion would be unreliable if based on the data used to construct
Ehrlich's equation, because the possibility of error increases as the
number of executions on which the prediction is based departs from
the average (75) over the period which Ehrlich studied.
24
II. Choice of Unit of Observation: Nation or State
Presumably because adequate data on arrests, convictions and execu-
tions-from which the risk of execution after conviction is computed-
are not readily available on a state-by-state basis, Ehrlich compared
executions and homicides for the nation as a whole. This aggregate
approach cannot measure the extent to which changes in the execution
23. Ehrlich posits a "murder supply function" in which the homicide rate is equal to
the product of execution risk and six other variables which in theory influence the
homicide rate. Ehrlich 1975, supra note 2, at 406 (equation (8)); pp. 179-80 infra. Each
of these seven explanatory variables is raised to an exponent-the elasticity of the homicide
rate with respect to that variable. If the elasticity for execution risk is negative, then as
execution risk approaches zero, the product of the variables approaches infinity (because
multiplication by a quantity raised to a negative exponent is equivalent to division by
the same quantity raised to a positive exponent-in this case, by a quantity approaching
zero). If the elasticity for execution risk is positive, then as execution risk approaches
zero, the product of the variables approaches zero. To perform the regression analysis
for the years 1968-1970, in which there were no executions, Ehrlich had to assume that
one execution in fact occurred each year. Ehrlich 1975, supra note 2, at 409 n.b.
24. See R. WONNACOrr & T. WONNAcoTT, ECONOMT'RiCs 27-34 (1970). The prediction
is based on execution risk, not number of executions. But as the latter declines so will
the former, as long as convictions do not decline in a greater proportion than executions.
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rate are associated with changes in the murder rate for individual
jurisdictions.
To illustrate this problem, consider the simplified example of a na-
tion composed of three states, two retentionist (R1 and R2) and one
abolitionist (A). Assume that execution risk decreases in R1 and re-
mains constant in the other states, and that the murder rate increases
in one state, not necessarily R1, and remains constant in the other
two. No matter which of the three states experiences the increase in
murders, the nation as a whole would show an aggregate increase in
murder rate and decrease in execution risk; analyzing these aggregate
figures would suggest a deterrent effect. This inference would be
justified only if the increase in the murder rate occurred in R1,
where execution risk has decreased. If instead the murder rate in-
creased in state A or R2, the aggregate correlation would be mis-
leading, because the increase in the murder rate in one jurisdiction
could not be attributed to lower execution risk in another. The ac-
tual behavior of the murder rate and execution risk in different juris-
dictions is, of course, far more complicated than in this example.
But the point remains that Ehrlich's use of national data obscures
the relationships between murder and execution rates and may yield
results which seem consistent with a deterrent effect where no such
effect actually exists. Sellin's comparison of murder rates in aboli-
tionist and retentionist states, on the other hand, shows us whether
or not homicide rates differ substantially in similar jurisdictions which
do and do not use capital punishment. Because it examines differences
in homicide rates among retentionist and abolitionist jurisdictions,
Sellin's work does not contain the aggregation errors which may vitiate
Ehrlich's results.
The aggregation approach used by Ehrlich has the further drawback
of concealing regional differences. It is well-known that homicide rates
are higher in the South than elsewhere in the United States, 25 and
it is entirely possible that the deterrent effects, if any, of capital pun-
ishment would vary from one part of the country to another. These
differences may be of considerable relevance to a decisionmaker con-
sidering the abolition of capital punishment in the United States.
Sellin's method, which compares data for groups of contiguous states,
would reveal regional differences if they existed; Ehrlich's approach,
which aggregates the data for the entire United States, cannot. The
fact that Sellin observed no deterrent effect in any region does not
25. See THE DEATH PENALTY, supra note 1, at 23; E. SUTHERLAND & D. CRESSEY,
CRIMINOLOGY 331 (1970).
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minimize the importance of taking a regional approach.26 It merely
adds plausibility to his conclusion that the threat of capital punishment
has no measurable deterrent effect.
III. Holding Other Factors Constant
The Solicitor General asserted that "perhaps most importantly,
[Sellin] failed to hold constant factors other than the death penalty
that might influence the rate of murders." The Solicitor General also
stated that Ehrlich's study alone was immune from this flaw.2 7 We
disagree. Sellin's matching method is simply a different technique for
taking account of the influence of other variables than the multiple
regression analysis used by Ehrlich. With either method there is the
risk that variables not taken into account, or imperfectly taken into
account, may influence the observed results. The issue is whether
Sellin's or Ehrlich's method is more successful in reducing that risk.
Sellin was acutely aware of the problem of controlling for the
influence of other variables on the murder rate. He recognized that
the problem had been neglected by earlier work on the deterrent ef-
fect of capital punishment,2 8 and used a matching method as "a de-
liberate attempt to eliminate differences other than those in punish-
ment policy that might influence the crime rate."29 A matching method
controls for the effect of other variables by comparing areas which
are as similar as possible with respect to those variables, but are dif-
ferent with respect to the variable whose effect is being isolated.
Sellin assumed that the important factors influencing the murder rate
were roughly similar in neighboring states. As Table III shows, this
assumption is supported by a state-by-state comparison for a small sam-
ple of the law enforcement and socioeconomic factors which Ehrlich
has hypothesized as determinants of the murder rate.30
26. The matching technique could not be applied in the Deep South, where there
are no abolitionist states. However, Sellin did compare homicide rates in Missouri, which
has authorized and applied the penalty, and Kansas, which did not enact it until 1935.
THE DEATH PENALTY, supra note 1, at 32-33.
27. Amicus Brief, supra note 5, at 37-38.
28. See Sellin, Capital Punishment, supra note I, at 6.
29. F. ZIMRING & G. HAWKINS, supra note 1, at 264. For this reason, Zimring and
Hawkins conclude that Sellin's work is "more reliable than nonmatched interstate com-
parisons." Id.
30. Table III presents comparative socioeconomic data for 1960 and law enforcement
data for 1966 for the five groups of states matched by Sellin. (The law enforcement data
reflect only a small, nonrandom sample of all the jurisdictions in each state, and are there-
fore unreliable.) The Table shows that the differences in these factors among the states in
each group are generally small, and more importantly, that they do not explain the
differences in the observed homicide rates. Consider, for example, the match between
abolitionist Rhode Island with a 1960 homicide rate of 1.0, and retentionist states
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There are, of course, difficulties in attempting to control for other
factors through a matching technique. In selecting areas for matching,
it always is possible that an important difference among states will be
overlooked. But such a difference would not vitiate the results of the
matching study unless the difference were consistently and systemati-
cally related to the choice of a punishment policy.31 The Solicitor
General suggested that a difference in arrest and conviction rates might
be systematically related to a difference in punishment policy, because
jurisdictions which abolish capital punishment could use an increased
likelihood of arrest and conviction as an alternative deterrent.32 A
finding that the homicide rate in a retentionist state was similar to
the rate in an abolitionist state with higher arrest and conviction rates
would then be consistent with the hypothesis of a deterrent effect for
capital punishment. However, neither the Solicitor General nor Ehrlich
offered evidence to support this relationship. 33
Ehrlich's multiple regression analysis controls for the influence of
variables other than execution risk by incorporating a set of additional
explanatory variables into a mathematical formula for the homicide
rate. Ehrlich posits a "murder function" in which the national homi-
cide rate is determined by execution risk and six other factors. Of the
six, two are law enforcement variables: the arrest rate (the fraction
of all murders which are cleared by the arrest of a suspect) and the
conviction rate (the fraction of suspects arrested for murder who are
subsequently convicted of murder). The other four are socioeconomic
variables: the labor force participation rate, the unemployment rate,
Massachusetts and Connecticut with homicide rates of 1.4 and 1.6 respectively. All but
two of the variabIes-civilian population and percentage of nonwhites-suggest that
Rhode Island's homicide rate should be higher than the neighboring states, while in
fact it is lower than the rates in both Massachusetts and Connecticut.
The sources of data in Table III are as follows: Column 1-legal status of death
penalty, F. ZIMING & G. HAWKINS, supra note 1, at 265; Column 2-homicide rate 1960,
FBI, UNIFORM CRIME REPORTS FOR THE UNITED STATES 34-37 (1961) (Table 2); Columns
3 & 4-FBI (unpublished data on file with Yale Law Journal); Columns 5 & 6-calculated
from BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, GENERAL SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC
CHARACTERISTICS: 1960 Table 5-3 (1961); Column 7-calculated from id. Table 59; Column
8-calculated from formula in M. FRIEDMAN, A THEORY OF THE CONSUMPTION FUNCTION 1
(1957), using data from E. Karni, The Value of Time and the Demand for Money, 1971,
Table 33 (unpublished doctoral dissertation, Univ. of Chicago), U.S. PUBLIC HEALTH
SERv., DEP'T OF HEALTH, EDUCATION, AND WELFARE, VITAL STATISTICS RATES IN THE UNITED
STATES 1940-1960 Table 74 (R. Grove & A. Hetzel eds. 1968), U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE,
SURVEY OF CURRENT BUSINESS 10 (Aug. 1956) (Table 1), and U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE,
SURVEY OF CURRENT BUSINESS 3 (Aug. 1974) (Table 2); Columns 9 & 10-calculated from
GENERAL SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC CHARACTERISTICS: 1960, supra, Table 5-3; Column 11-
BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, DATA BY STATES: 1960, at 27 (1961)
(Table 15); Column 12-id. at 29-30 (Table 16).
31. F. ZIMRING & G. HAWKINS, supra note 1, at 266.
32. Amicus Brief, supra note 5, at 37-38.
33. Id. But see Ehrlich 1975, supra note 1, at 411.
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the fraction of the population in the age group 14 to 24, and estimated
per capita income. 34 The regression analysis applied to these variables
yields an algebraic equation which gives a numerical estimate of the
effect of each explanatory variable on the homicide rate. In this sense,
Ehrlich's study accounts more precisely for the influence of this set
of factors than does Sellin's study.
This precision, however, is misleading. In order for the statistical
results to be reliable, the equation must include all variables which
significantly affect the homicide rate. The omission of any significant
variable not only renders the model incapable of fully explaining
the behavior of the homicide rate, but distorts the effects of those
variables which have been included.35 The regression method is there-
fore best suited to testing a hypothesis based on a well-developed
theory which isolates a few determinants of the variable under study.
Hypotheses about the causes of murder cannot rely on such a theory.
Ehrlich's analysis relies on an economic postulate-"that the propensity
to perpetuate such crimes [as murder] is influenced by the prospective
gains and losses associated with their commission."' 36 There is no reason
to think that economics or any other discipline has yet identified the
determinants of the murder rate with enough confidence to rely on
results obtained from regression analysis. Indeed, there are strong a
priori reasons for thinking that the murder rate would be influenced
by a number of variables not considered by Ehrlich, such as rates of
migration from rural to urban areas, per capita ownership of weapons,
and the level of violent crimes against property. As Zimring and Haw-
kins point out in their discussion of deterrence:
Very few, if any, studies done on the impact of criminal law
variations on crime give us reason to believe that most of the
many factors which should be included in such a statistical anal-
ysis are present and accounted for.
34. Ehrlich 1975, supra note 2, at 398-402 (theoretical discussion of factors influencing
murder), 406-09 (empirical discussion of data chosen to measure those factors). In sub-
stituting the measured for the true homicide rate, Ehrlich inserts a time trend as an
explanatory variable. Id. at 406-07.
35. The extent to which the regression analysis explains the behavior of the homicide
rate is measured by the coefficient of determination, which is not less than zero and not
greater than one. A regression which omits a relevant variable will have a lower co-
efficient of determination than a regression which correctly specifies the relationship.
The omission of important variables from the regression model will also bias the
results obtained for the variables which are included. See J. JOHNSTON, ECONOMETRIC
METHODS 169 (2d ed. 1972) ("exclusion of relevant variables from the regression may
be a very serious error . . .") (emphasis in original), 244 (omitted variables may cause the
statistical problem of serial correlation in the disturbance term).
36. Ehrlich 1975, supra note 2, at 398-99. His other "basic proposition" is that these
crimes are committed largely as a result of "interpersonal conflicts involving pecuniary
and nonpecuniary motives." Id. at 398.
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... Only when the statistical complexity of such methods lulls
the researcher into a false sense that all relevant variables have
been accounted for, or that natural variations are in fact present,
does multiple-correlation analysis become more dangerous than
helpful.
37
Our a priori skepticism about the adequacy of the variables in-
cluded in Ehrlich's model is supported by the results of reanalyses of
his data, which we discuss below.38 These reanalyses found that the
sign of the elasticity for execution risk changes from positive to nega-
tive when the recent years are dropped from Ehrlich's data series.
The apparent change in the effect of execution risk on the homicide
rate indicates that the variables included by Ehrlich do not explain
the behavior of the homicide rate in a consistent manner over sub-
periods in his sample and suggests that variables not included by
Ehrlich may be necessary for a better explanation.
Regression analysis requires the assumption not only that the homi-
cide rate is a function of a fixed set of variables, but also that the
function has a particular mathematical form. Ehrlich postulated that
the homicide rate was equal to the product of seven explanatory vari-
ables and a random error term. The equation which Ehrlich actually
estimates is a particular characterization of this relationship in which
the logarithm of the homicide rate is set equal to the weighted sum of
the logarithms of the explanatory variables. The weights provide es-
timates of the effect of each explanatory variable on the homicide
rate. Since other investigators who have performed Ehrlich's regression
analysis using natural numbers rather than logarithms have found no
evidence of a deterrent effect, Ehrlich's results seem to depend on
his assumptions about the mathematical form of the relationship. 3
Even assuming that Ehrlich's regression equation successfully iso-
lated the true determinants of the murder function and correctly speci-
fied its mathematical form, a serious problem remains with Ehrlich's
use of the equation to estimate the tradeoff between executions and
murders. Ehrlich measures this tradeoff by the partial elasticity of the
homicide rate with respect to the execution rate-the percent decrease
in homicide rate produced by a one percent increase in execution risk,
assuming that the other variables 'affecting the murder rate are held
constant as execution risk varies. The estimated elasticity of -. 065 im-
37. F. ZIMRINc & G. HAWKINS, supra note 1, at 267-68. Multiple correlation analysis
is closely related to, but less sophisticated than, the multiple regression technique used
by Ehrlich. See R. WONNACOTT & T. WoNNAcorr, supra note 24, at 103-30; note 13 supra.
38. Pp. 184-85 infra.
39. See id.
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plies that at the average levels of executions and murders during the
period studied, an additional execution would result in seven or eight
fewer murders. 40 Yet, as Ehrlich recognizes, the conviction rate is
likely to decline as execution risk increases, because juries seem less
inclined to convict a defendant charged with murder the greater the
chance the defendant will subsequently be executed.41 Since in Ehr-
lich's model the conviction rate also has a deterrent effect, the effect
of the decline in the conviction rate will tend to offset the effect
of the increase in execution risk. Indeed, if a one percent increase
in execution risk produces more than a .175 percent decrease in the
conviction rate, then the effect on the homicide rate of the decrease
in the conviction rate will outweigh the effect of the increase in ex-
ecution risk. As a result, the increase in execution risk will cause a
net increase, rather than a decrease, in the homicide rate.42 In re-
40. Ehrlich 1975, supra note 2, at 414 & n.15.
41. Id. at 405. In estimating his equations, Ehrlich used a two-stage procedure de-
signed to take account of the interdependence of the law enforcement variables. Ehrlich
1973, supra note 2, at 50-60 (statistical appendix). We note that Ehrlich's second stage re-
gression does not hold fixed the four socioeconomic variables which he uses in the first
stage but which he does not explicitly include in his murder supply function. Ehrlich
1975, supra note 2, at 409 (variables denoted X. in Table 2-fraction of nonwhites in
residential population, civilian population, per capita real expenditures of all governments,
per capita real expenditures on police). Our fundamental criticism, however, is that in
using those estimates to calculate the tradeoff between murders and executions, he ne-
glected the interdependence.
42. We owe this point to P. Passell & J. Taylor, The Deterrent Effect of Capital
Punishment: Another View, Feb. 1975, at 9-11 (Discussion Paper 74-7509, Columbia Univ.
Dep't of Economics) (on file with Yale Law Journal). Figure 1 depicts the net effect of
the increase in execution risk Peic.
Figure 1





Probability of Conviction given 
Arrest: Pca
The arrows represent causal influences, and the numbers accompanying the arrows
represent the elasticities reported by Ehrlich in Equation 3 of his Table 4. Ehrlich
1975, supra note 2, at 410. The question mark represents the elasticity of the probability
of conviction given arrest, Pcla, with respect to the probability of execution given con-
viction, Peic. Given the reluctance of juries to convict where execution may follow, this
elasticity is expected to be negative, i.e., as Pejc increases, Pcja decreases. According to
these elasticities, a decline of one percent in the probability of conviction would be
associated with a .065 percent increase in the homicide rate. But that same one percent
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porting his estimated tradeoffs between executions and murders, Ehr-
lich conceded that "[t]he actual tradeoffs . . . depend partly upon
the ability of law enforcement agencies to control simultaneously all
[law enforcement variables]"-in other words, to hold arrest and con-
viction rates constant as execution risk increases. 43 Moreover, in per-
forming another regression which eliminated this problem of interac-
tion between execution risk and the conviction rate, he found smaller,
although in most cases still significant, deterrent effects. 44
Given the difficulty of isolating the determinants of the homicide
rate, specifying their mathematical form, and adjusting for the inter-
action between execution risk and the other law enforcement variables,
it is not at all clear that Ehrlich's analysis is more reliable than Sellin's.
It is certainly not true that Ehrlich's study of the deterrent effect of
the death penalty is uniquely successful in holding other factors con-
stant. The problems are not that simple, nor Ehrlich's approach that
satisfactory.
IV. Replication and Corroboration by Other Studies
As we have shown, both matching and regression techniques are
necessarily imperfect methods for testing the deterrent effect of capital
punishment. Given these inherent imperfections in research technique,
the credibility attaching to each study depends on the extent to which
consistent results are obtained when a similar approach is applied to
different data. A crucial test of the reliability of the results is whether
they can be reproduced or corroborated by other studies.
Sellin consistently found no discernible effect of capital punishment
on homicide rates in matching a large number of clusters of states. At
least four other investigators have used the matching method on dif-
ferent data and reached similar conclusions. 4 5 Moreover, Sellin's re-
decline in the probability of execution given conviction would lead to some unknown
(X percent) increase in the probability of conviction given arrest. And this in-
crease would lead in turn to a decrease of .37 X X percent in the homicide rate, com-
pensating more or less for the increase in the homicide rate resulting directly from
the decline in the probability of execution given conviction. In particular, if the elas-
ticity of Pc[a with respect to Pcle is .175 percent, the result from this causal chain will
be a .065 percent (.175 X .37) decrease in the homicide rate. This decrease will exactly
offset the .065 percent increase in the homicide rate resulting from the decline in the
probability of execution given conviction.
43. Ehrlich 1975, supra note 2, at 415.
44. Id. at 415 n.16. But see P. Passell & J. Taylor, supra note 42, at 10-11 (arguing
these results are unreliable).
45. W. BOWERS, supra note I, at 137-47 (homicide rates in abolitionist states and
contiguous retentionist states for four years prior and subsequent to the 1967 judicial
moratorium on capital punishment); Bailey, Murder and the Death Penalty, 65 J. CRIM.
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sults are independently corroborated by his comparisons of crime rates
in particular jurisdictions before and after capital punishment was
either adopted or repealed.4 6 These longitudinal studies have im-
perfections of their own, but as Zimring and Hawkins point out, "the
combination of two or more imperfect research approaches may reveal
a relatively clear picture about the relation of the variables being
studied to rates of crime.
' 47
Ehrlich also recognized the need for the broadest possible empirical
base for his conclusions. He analyzed his data with six different mea-
sures for the key explanatory variable-execution risk-and obtained
similar results.48 He indicated concern that his analysis not be unduly
sensitive to changes in the time period to which it was applied, to
minor modifications in the selection or computation of variables in-
cluded in the analysis, or to the use of natural values rather than log-
arithms as a functional form.49 Reapplying the statistical analysis to
data spanning shorter time periods, he reported results generally con-
sistent, if not in perfect agreement, with his basic conclusions5"
However, the efforts of Passell and Taylor to reproduce Ehrlich's re-
sults using identical estimation procedures have yielded significant dis-
crepancies, apparently due to minor differences in the data on which
the replication was based.51 These discrepancies necessarily call into
L. & CRIN'Y 416, 421 (1974) (eight groups of states); Schuessler, The Deterrent Influence
of the Death Penalty, 284 ANNALS 54, 58 (1952) (fie groups); Sutherland, Murder and
the Death Penalty, 15 J. CrIM. L. & CRIMf'Y 522, 526 (1925) (one group of states and one
group of cities).
46. THE DEATH PENALTY, supra note 1, at 34-38 (American states), 38-50 (foreign
countries). From the behavior of homicide rates before and after the change in punish-
ment policy, Sellin concluded that the death penalty "exercises no influence on the
extent or fluctuating rates of capital crimes." Id. at 63. Other longitudinal studies
confirm Sellin's results. W. BowErs, supra note 1, at 147-57 (comparing homicide rates
in states changing from mandatory to discretionary capital punishment); Fattah, The
Canadian Experiment with Abolition of the Death Penalty, in IV. BowERs, supra at 121;
Samuelson, Why was Capital Punishment Restored in Delaware?, 60 J. CRIM. L.C. & P.S.
148, 149 (1969); Schuessler, supra note 45, at 58-59.
47. F. ZIMRXNrG & G. HAWKINS, supra note I, at 270.
48. Ehrlich 1975, supra note 2, at 407-08 (definition of the six measures of exccution
risk), 410-11 (regression results for each measure).
49. Id. at 412-13.
50. Id. at 410 (Table 4), 413 ("[T]he qualitative results . . . are for the most part
insensitive to changes in the specific interval of time . . . . However, the absolute
magnitudes of some of the estimated elasticities . . . do change when estimated from
different subperiods.")
51. P. Passell & J. Taylor, supra note 42, at 2-4. Ehrlich has provided complete
documentation of the data sources for his study in a memorandum released in August,
1975, and dated May, 1975. The Deterrent Effect of Capital Punishment: A Question
of Life and Death, American Economic Review (June, 1975): Sources of Data (on file with
Yale Law Journal). This documentation was not available at the time of the replications
by Passell and Taylor. Consequently these authors were forced to reconstruct parts of
the data base using whatever procedures seemed most appropriate.
Passell and Taylor note in particular the need to reconstruct time series for Friedman's
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question the reliability of Ehrlich's conclusions. More importantly,
further analysis of Ehrlich's data by Passell and Taylor, and later by
Bowers and Pierce, indicates that the evidence of a deterrent effect
reported by Ehrlich disappears when the model is estimated with
natural numbers rather than logarithms or when it is estimated for
shorter time periods which exclude the recent years from 1963 to
1 96 9 
52 Furthermore, Ehrlich's model does not explain the homicide
rate as well over the long run (1935-1969) as it does in shorter periods,
for which it reveals no significant relationship between execution risk
and the homicide rate. If a model correctly explains a set of relation-
ships, it will not decrease in explanatory power as more data (years,
in the present context) are brought into the analysis. Ehrlich's model
has just the opposite property-showing less predictive power over the
long run than over the short run. A final piece of evidence on the
issue of corroboration is a recent regression study, based on Ehrlich's
theoretical model but using 1950 and 1960 data for more than 40
states, which found no deterrent effects associated with execution risk.5a
Conclusion
It is quite possible that because of the complexity of the social phe-
nomenon involved, we will never know with certainty whether capital
punishment does or does not deter murder. Statistical analyses can
only test with the available data the hypothesis that a significant de-
terrent effect exists. On the basis of the work of Sellin and others who
have taken his approach, we are inclined to attach more credibility to
their view that capital punishment does not have a significant deterrent
effect. The credibility we assign to this hypothesis is based upon our
confidence in Sellin's choice of a variable to measure the threat of
capital punishment, in his use of the state rather than the nation as
his unit of observation, in his technique for controlling for the in-
fluence of other variables which affect the homicide rate, and in the
consistent results which he and others have produced applying these
methods to different time periods and different jurisdictions.
estimated permanent income and labor force participation as well as particular values
from the police expenditure and conviction rate series which Ehrlich had estimated by an
unspecified process of interpolation. P. Passell & J. Taylor, supra at 3.
52. P. Passell & J. Taylor, supra note 42, at 4-8; Bowers & Pierce, The Illusion of
Deterrence in Isaac Ehrlich's Research on Capital Punishment, 85 YALE L.J. 187
(1975). Ehrlich reported that his "regression results [were] found to be robust with
respect to the functional form of the regression equation," but offered no results in
support of this statement. Ehrlich 1975, supra note 2, at 412.
53. Passell, The Deterrent Effect of the Death Penalty: A Statistical Test, 28 STAN.
L. REv. 61 (1975).
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Given this substantial body of competent research, we are unwilling
to abandon the view that it supports on the basis of Ehrlich's single
study. Ehrlich's study relies on a measure of the death penalty threat
which does not reflect the relationship between executions and mur-
ders in specific jurisdictions and which does not focus on the relevant
policy question of the effect of abolition. Moreover Ehrlich's estimated
tradeoff rests on the highly doubtful assumptions (1) that the probabili-
ty of conviction could be kept constant while the probability of execu-
tion varies, and (2) that the equation used to control for the effects
of variables other than execution risk combines all the significant de-
terminants of the homicide rate in the proper mathematical form.
The use of the Sellin and Ehrlich studies in the context of a con-
stitutional challenge to capital punishment illustrates the need for
judicial procedures to evaluate statistical analysis presented by litigants
in support of their positions. There is a certain danger in relying on
academic work, designed to promote inquiry and further research,
as a basis for deciding disputes in a court of law-especially where the
stakes involved are high and the implications for society are great.
The courts presently do not provide systematic factfinding procedures
to resolve issues of "legislative" fact54 that are critical to the policy judg-
ments courts must make. Until the courts develop procedures to bring
complex statistical studies under the scrutiny of the adversary process,
it will be necessary to carry on the technical debate over such legislative
facts largely in the law reviews.
54. K. DAVIS, ADimINISTRATIVE LAW TEXT § 7.03, at 160 (3d ed. 1972).
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